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We provide a critical review of research in economics that has examined causal 
relationships between alcohol use and crime.  We lay out several causal pathways 
through which alcohol regulation and alcohol consumption may affect crime, including: 
direct pharmacological effects on aggression, reaction time, and motor impairment; 
excuse motivations; venues and social interactions; and victimization risk.  We focus our 
review on four main types of alcohol regulations: price/tax restrictions, age-based 
availability restrictions, spatial availability restrictions, and temporal availability 
restrictions.  We conclude that there is strong evidence that tax- and age-based 
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1. Introduction 
A substantial body of research in economics, criminology, and public health documents 
an association between alcohol availability, alcohol consumption, and crime.
1  Though 
much of the literature is focused on violent crime, many studies have also examined the 
link between alcohol and property crimes, nuisance crimes, and crimes that result directly 
from alcohol consumption such as driving under the influence (DUI).  Most of these have 
found a large and statistically significant relationship between alcohol consumption and 
crime. 
  The very strong correlations between alcohol consumption and crime raise the 
possibility that alcohol regulations may be effective crime reduction tools.  Specifically, 
if alcohol consumption causes people to commit crimes or increases the chance they will 
be victimized, then laws and regulations designed to reduce the availability of  alcohol 
may reduce crime.  However, if the correlation between alcohol use and crime is due in 
total or in part to unobserved individual factors (such as risk preferences) or to 
unobserved local factors (such as neighborhood quality), then alcohol regulation may not 
be an effective crime prevention tool.  And even if alcohol consumption by some people 
does increase the probability that they will commit crimes, it is not obvious that alcohol 
regulations will significantly reduce consumption in this population; thus it would be 
possible for certain policies to impose social costs without significantly reducing crime.  
Despite these concerns, alcohol regulation as a crime reduction strategy is worth 
                                                 
1 While some crimes such as driving under the influence (DUI) and public intoxication are clearly linked to 
alcohol use, here we concern ourselves primarily with crimes for which a causal role for alcohol is possible 
but not obvious.  One reason for this is that the effects of alcohol control policies on DUI and alcohol-
related fatalities have been extensively studied and reviewed elsewhere.  We focus primarily on the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation’s index crimes, which consist of violent crimes (murder, rape, robbery, and 
aggravated assault) and property crimes (larceny, burglary, and motor vehicle theft). 
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examining because alcohol consumption is so strongly associated with crime and because 
there is wide latitude for changing alcohol regulations in the United States.
2 
In this chapter we offer a critical review of existing research on alcohol and crime 
from the perspective of economics.  Notably, we are not the first to apply economic 
perspectives to alcohol control policies (see, e.g., Manning 1989; Pogue and Sgontz 1989; 
Kenkel 1996; Kenkel and Manning 1996; Cook 2007).  We review most of the serious 
policy options that use alcohol control to bring about reductions in crime, but other, less 
commonly debated policy options exist as well.  We are not the first to review the 
evidence on the effects of alcohol control policies on alcohol consumption and adverse 
outcomes; indeed, we draw heavily from previous reviews of alcohol control from Cook 
and Moore 2000, Chaloupka et al. 2002, Chaloupka 2004, and others.  Those reviews, 
however, differ from ours in at least two important ways.  First, previous reviews have 
largely (but not exclusively) focused on the monetary price of alcohol and associated tax-
based interventions.  Second, most earlier reviews have focused on a wider range of 
alcohol-related outcomes, such as motor vehicle fatalities, accidental injury, risky sexual 
behavior, and productivity, in addition to crime.  This focus on a broader set of outcomes 
is a natural way to research the effect of price and tax interventions.  Here, however, we 
expand the scope of alcohol regulations under review but focus entirely on their effect on 
crime.  This broader look incorporates a body of evidence from other countries and 
regions (especially Scandinavia) that have used a variety of natural experiment designs to 
study the effects of non-price restrictions on alcohol availability and crime.  It also 
permits examination of several recent high-quality studies that have provided important 
                                                 
2 Potential changes include alcohol increasing the excise tax, raising the drinking age,  adopting tougher 
drunk-driving laws, restricting liquor license availability, further restricting the hours/days/locations of 
alcohol sales, and more strictly enforcing existing laws against underage drinking. 
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information about alcohol's causal role in crime using variation in liquor store density, 
bar closing hours, and age-based alcohol restrictions, among others.   
We pay particular attention to studies that take the causal inference problem 
seriously.  This focus is appropriate given the chapter's focus on policy-relevant crime 
control strategies.  It is important to accurately assess the strengths and weaknesses of the 
evidence before deciding to continue using a particular type of regulation, taking into 
account endogeneity, simultaneity, unobserved heterogeneity, and associated evaluation 
problems.  We also pay close attention to whether alcohol regulations reduce crime rates 
or just displace crimes to different times or places, and we highlight the need to 
distinguish between the effects of alcohol restrictions on criminals and the effects on 
victims. 
  The chapter proceeds as follows.  First, we review evidence from laboratory 
studies on the pharmacological effects of alcohol consumption on the brain and behavior.   
We use this and other evidence to lay out several pathways by which alcohol 
consumption could lead to the commission of crime.  We also address the relationship 
between alcohol and other drugs, with respect to both consumption and regulation.  We 
then review studies on the relationship between alcohol regulations and crime, grouping 
them by the type of alcohol regulation examined (tax/price restrictions, age-based 
restrictions, spatial restrictions, temporal restrictions, and regulations not otherwise 
classified).  We summarize what is known about the value of each type of regulation and 
conclude with a discussion of economic considerations in assessing the importance of 
alcohol regulations as part of an effective crime control strategy. 
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2. The Pharmacological Effects of Alcohol 
Although pharmacological effects are not the only mechanism by which alcohol 
consumption causes crime, it is a major one.  People’s "blood-alcohol concentration" 
(BAC) from drinking affects their level of impairment differently, according to their 
individual characteristics.  The most important is the size of the dose.  The number of 
drinks consumed, the speed with which they are consumed, and the alcohol content of the 
drinks are the major determinants of the dose.  Dose size is moderated by numerous 
individual characteristics.  Heavier and more muscular individuals have more water mass 
and as a consequence will reach a lower BAC than a smaller, less muscular individual 
who has consumed the same amount of alcohol. Individuals also differ substantially in 
the rate at which the liver metabolizes alcohol.  For example, there is evidence that older 
individuals metabolize alcohol more slowly than younger individuals and chronic 
drinkers metabolize alcohol more rapidly than less frequent drinkers. 
Generally speaking, a 160-pound man will reach a BAC of .02% (or 2 grams per 
100 milliliters of blood) after one standard-sized drink (roughly one shot [1–1.5 ounces] 
of liquor, one 12-ounce beer, or one 5-ounce glass of wine).  That same man will reach a 
BAC of .05%, .07%, .09%, and .12% after two, three, four, and five drinks, respectively, 
and will accordingly reach increasingly higher blood alcohol concentrations with 
successive drinks (assuming no time between drinks).  A similarly sized woman will, on 
average, reach a higher BAC after the same number of drinks due to sex-specific 
differences in body composition. 
  Though the exact level of impairment at a given BAC varies from person to 
person, intoxication due to alcohol usually follows several stages associated with 
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different BAC levels.  At low BACs (below .05%), alcohol can induce enjoyment, 
happiness, and euphoria characterized by increased sociability and talkativeness.  Loss of 
inhibitions and reduced attention are also characteristic of this level of intoxication.  At 
higher BACs (.06%–.10%), disinhibition is more apparent, as are impairments in 
judgment, coordination, concentration, reflexes, depth perception, distance acuity, and 
peripheral vision.  Because these impairments can be dangerous in certain environments, 
many countries set the BAC at which a driver is considered legally impaired at 
either .05% or .08% (often lower for younger or less experienced drivers).  In the 
range .11%–.30%, individuals experience exaggerated emotional states, including anger 
and sadness; they may also have a higher pain threshold, reduced reaction time, loss of 
balance, slurred speech, and moderate to severe motor impairment.  At extremely high 
BACs (above .35%), individuals are likely to suffer from incontinence or  impaired 
respiration, or they may lose consciousness and even die from respiratory arrest.  For 
lower levels of BAC, many of the effects have been documented in controlled laboratory 
settings, particularly impairments of driving-related skills and tasks. 
Laboratory experiments have been used extensively to estimate whether and to 
what extent acute alcohol consumption increases aggressive behaviors in humans.
3  In the 
most common experimental design, individuals are told they will be competing against a 
competitor in a different location, with the winner of each task choosing the severity of 
the electric shock that the loser receives.  In reality, there is no competitor in these 
experiments, and the outcomes (i.e., whether the subject wins or loses the timed task) are 
predetermined.  The magnitude and severity of the shocks chosen by the subjects provide 
                                                 
3 Notably, the increases in aggression attributable to alcohol have also been documented in controlled 
experiments with mice and primates, suggesting a fundamental biological link between alcohol and 
aggression. 
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a measure of aggression.  The subjects are told either that they will be served an alcoholic 
beverage or that they will be served a non-alcoholic beverage.  Individuals in each group 
are randomly served an alcoholic beverage or a non-alcoholic beverage.  Comparing the 
level of the electric shocks chosen by the people in the four groups allows researchers to 
separate the effects of alcohol from the effects due to alcohol-based expectations.  These 
experiments typically find that people who consume the beverage with alcohol, whether 




3. Possible Causal Pathways and Mechanisms from Alcohol to Crime 
In this section we examine several of the causal pathways through which alcohol 
consumption leads to crime (Fagan 1990, Pernanen 1981).
5  Most public policies 
targeting alcohol consumption have the potential to influence more than one causal 
pathway, making it challenging to determine exactly how important each pathway is.  As 
a result, it is not possible to rank them perfectly; however, we discuss the pathways in 
what we believe is roughly their order of importance: (1) direct pharmacological effects 
                                                 
4 It is worth noting that the majority of the experiments examining how alcohol affects aggression have 
studied either college undergraduates or alcoholics, somewhat limiting the generalizability of the findings.  
Also, the dose-response relationship observed between alcohol consumption and aggression is highly non-
linear: although through much of the range of BAC alcohol increases aggression, at very high levels it 
results in sedation.  Finally, the pharmacological effects of alcohol can differ markedly from the effects of 
other drugs; we discuss this below in Section 4. 
5 It is important to acknowledge that some sociologists and criminologists suggest that the links among 
alcohol, crime, and violence do not result from a causal mechanism of the type we describe here.  Some 
common alternative hypotheses include the possibility that unobserved factors such as risk preference or 
taste for deviance cause both variation in alcohol consumption and variation in crime or that some income-
producing crime is itself a cause (not a consequence) of alcohol and other drugs (Fagan 1993 and others).  
That these types of explanations would produce the same observed associations between alcohol use and 
crime as a true causal effect (defined below) is why we focus on studies that seriously address the 
possibility of omitted variables bias.   
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on aggression and cognitive functioning; (2) the “excuse” mechanism; and (3) the role of 
social interactions and venues. 
Arguably the most direct pathway from alcohol consumption to crime is through 
its direct pharmacological effects.  By increasing aggression and heightening emotional 
responses, acute alcohol use may cause increases in interpersonal violence, including 
murder, rape, robbery, and assault.  And by reducing cognitive functioning and altering 
normal judgment and decision-making abilities, drinking may lead to alcohol-induced 
myopia or short-sightedness.  Individuals so afflicted may engage in criminal activity 
because they fail to recognize the social and legal consequences of their actions.   The 
pharmacological effects of alcohol may also have a causal effect on crime by increasing 
the risk of victimization.  Excessively large doses of alcohol, for example, lead to 
sedation rather than aggression, which may make intoxicated individuals easy targets of 
various types of crime. And impaired cognitive functioning and decision-making may 
place individuals in situations where they are at increased risk of victimization.  
Unfortunately, for reasons outlined below it is difficult to disentangle alcohol's effect on 
crime commission from its effect on criminal victimization, and as a result very little 
research has been conducted on this important question.   
  Alcohol may also increase crime by providing an “excuse motive” for crime 
commission.  It is conceivable that someone considering a criminal act could believe that 
being inebriated would lessen the punishment for a crime if the case came to trial. 
Alcohol consumption may also lead a person to justify antisocial activities to himself or 
the people around him.  Policies that succeeded in reducing alcohol availability could 
remove the “excuse motive” in some instances.  
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  Alcohol consumption may also increase the incidence of interpersonal violence by 
increasing social contact, which again may be relevant both for crime commission and for 
criminal victimization.  A closely related mechanism is venue: alcohol regulations can 
dictate the location and setting of alcohol use either directly (e.g., through bar closing 
hours or licensing of on-premises outlets where alcohol is consumed at the same location 
after purchase) or indirectly (e.g., by lowering the drinking age and thereby increasing the 
number of public venues where youths can legally consume alcohol).  When people 
consume alcohol in public places such as bars they will have more interactions than they 
would if they had stayed home.  Even in private venues alcohol is often enjoyed in social 
group settings.  Indeed, one of alcohol's pharmacological effects is to make individuals 
more talkative and outwardly social in the short term.  Alcohol use may therefore 
increase the number of interpersonal interactions at risk for a criminal incident, and in 
public venues those interactions are more likely to be with strangers and involve 
negotiations over personal space, further increasing the risk of a violent conclusion to the 
interaction. 
  Most of the studies of the impact of alcohol regulations are ecological studies, 
which find that regulations can plausibly impact more than one of the mechanisms 
described above.  Because the individual effect of each mechanism is difficult to 
determine, it is also difficult to predict how a new regulation that targets only one 
mechanism is likely to affect crime rates.  However, the reduced-form findings are still of 
substantial value since most new policies are likely to have characteristics similar to 
those of existing policies. 
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4. Alcohol and Crime versus Other Drugs and Crime 
Our focus here is on the relationship between alcohol regulations and crime as distinct 
from the relationship between the regulation of illicit drugs (such as marijuana, 
methamphetamines, heroin, and cocaine) and crime, which is the focus of other work in 
this volume (see chapter by Pollack and Reuter).  One reason for this distinction is that 
the production, purchase, sale, and distribution of alcohol are not criminogenic in the 
same way as the production, purchase, sale, and distribution of illicit drugs such as 
opiates and cocaine.  Because marijuana and hard drugs are illegal, a substantial portion 
of the crime associated with these drugs is caused by the dangerous nature of the illicit 
markets.  Evaluating policies that target illegal drugs is therefore even more complex than 
evaluating policies aimed at alcohol abuse.  
Another reason to distinguish alcohol from other drugs when considering the 
effects of their consumption on crime is that the pharmacological and behavioral effects 
of alcohol differ significantly from those of the most commonly consumed illicit drugs.  
While several laboratory studies and reviews of the literature (described above) have 
documented a causal effect of alcohol consumption on aggression and disinhibition, 
controlled experiments in animals and humans that examine other substances indicate a 
range of behavioral effects.  Probably the closest to alcohol in its pharmacological effects 
is cocaine, which has similarly been shown to increase aggression, reduce self-control, 
and increase irritability (Washton 1987).  Amphetamines can also produce an increase in 
aggression; however, unlike the aggression induced by alcohol it is sometimes 
accompanied by a paranoid psychotic state that independently may contribute to violent 
acts.  In contrast, marijuana has generally been found to inhibit (rather than promote) 
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aggressive behavior in humans, mice, fish, and primates (Miczek et al. 1994).  Similarly, 
opiates have been shown to decrease aggressive behavior and hostility in animals and 
humans, though the period of opiate withdrawal is usually characterized as increasing 
risk for aggressive behaviors.  Thus alcohol has a pharmacological profile that is 
significantly different from that of the most commonly consumed illicit drugs. 
  The differential pharmacological effects of alcohol and other drugs on human 
behavior raise a potentially important issue regarding the role of alcohol regulation and 
crime control.  Specifically, it is possible that alcohol use is related to the use of other 
drugs in an underlying structural way.  Specifically, if alcohol and other drugs are 
complements in consumption, then an increase in the price of alcohol (through, for 
example, stricter regulations) will reduce not only drinking (through the own-price effect) 
but also use of other drugs (through a cross-price effect).  In contrast, if alcohol and other 
drugs are substitutes in consumption, then an increase in the price of alcohol will reduce 
drinking but will lead to an increase in the use of other drugs.  Existing research is mixed 
on this question and has focused primarily on the study of marijuana.  While some studies 
find evidence that alcohol and marijuana are substitutes in consumption (DiNardo and 
Lemieux 2001; Conlin et al. 2005), others find that the two are complements (Pacula 
1988).
6  The relationship is potentially important because some research has suggested a 
                                                 
6 DiNardo and Lemieux (2001) use variation induced by state drinking age changes (described in more 
detail below in the review of age-based alcohol restrictions) and find that exposure to a more restrictive 
drinking age significantly reduced alcohol consumption by high school seniors but significantly increased 
marijuana consumption, suggesting that alcohol and marijuana are substitutes in consumption among 
youths.  Conlin et al. (2005) use changes between “wet” and “dry” status from local prohibition referenda 
in Texas in a quasi-experimental framework and find a significant inverse relationship between alcohol 
availability and illicit drug-related crimes, suggesting that alcohol and illicit drugs are substitutes.  Pacula 
(1998) uses data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youths and finds that increases in the beer tax 
reduce both drinking and marijuana use among young adults, suggesting the two goods are complements in 
consumption. 
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direct causal effect of marijuana on the commission of income-producing and property 
crimes (Pacula and Kilmer 2003).
7 
  Why might this matter?  The vast majority of the empirical research reviewed 
below relies on estimating reduced-form relationships between alcohol control policies 
and crime.  If alcohol control policies influence both the consumption of alcohol and 
illicit drugs, we will observe the total or net effect of these two mechanisms. 
 
5. A Critical Evaluation and Summary of Research on the Effects of Alcohol Regulations 
on Alcohol Consumption and Crime 
A key reason that alcohol control merits attention as a possible crime control strategy is 
that access to alcohol is highly manipulable by public policy through various types of 
regulations.  Indeed, much of the research we review compares the effects of regulations 
across areas and changes within areas over time as a way of identifying alcohol’s causal 
role in the commission of crime.  We group our review by types of alcohol regulation, 
which broadly correspond to different types of research designs that have been used to 
identify the effects of alcohol on crime.  These include: excise taxes on alcohol; age-
based restrictions such as minimum legal drinking ages; spatial restrictions on alcohol 
outlet density and availability; temporal restrictions on alcohol sale; and other 
                                                 
7 Pacula and Kilmer (2003) use ADAM and UCR data to estimate fixed-effects models of crime with 
controls for alcohol, cocaine, and marijuana prices.  They find that higher marijuana prices (which should 
be associated with lower marijuana use) were associated with lower rates of income-producing and 
property crime but not violent crime, which is consistent with pharmacological evidence suggesting that 
marijuana decreases aggression in the short term.  As noted above, there is less research addressing whether 
alcohol and illicit drugs other than marijuana are substitutes or complements.  Again, this may be important 
because some previous research suggests a causal effect of cocaine consumption on crime.  Desimone 
(2001), for example, uses data from 29 large cities in the period 1981-1995 and instruments for the 
endogeneity of cocaine prices with wholesale supply factors and retail enforcement intensity and finds a 
significant negative association between the price of cocaine and every index crime except assault.  His 
results suggest that there are independent causal effects of cocaine use (i.e., consumption) on crime apart 
from effects on criminality associated with the production, sale, and distribution of the drug. 
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“circumstance” regulations that combine elements of spatial and temporal alcohol 




5.1 Regulations on the tax/price of alcohol 
Economists studying the relationship between alcohol and crime have largely focused on 
alcohol control policies that change the full price of alcohol either directly (through 
alcohol excise taxes) or indirectly (through other non-price availability restrictions).  In 
this section we review and evaluate studies that have leveraged variation in excise taxes 
to identify alcohol’s role in crime.  Studies of this variety have natural appeal to 
economists because they are firmly grounded in economic theory: a tax-induced increase 
in the price of alcohol should reduce alcohol consumption by the law of demand.  
Moreover, there is a great deal of variation across states and countries in alcohol excise 
taxes, and there is also some variation within areas over time, which allows estimation of 
more credible fixed-effects models of the effects of taxes on alcohol prices, drinking, and 
crime.  Indeed, previous research confirms that alcohol taxes are passed through to prices 
(a necessary condition for taxes to affect alcohol consumption and crime).  Young and 
Bielinska-Kwapisz (2002) and Stehr (2007) both use quasi-experimental approaches to 
document that taxes are fully shifted to prices by matching tax information to commonly 
used local price data from the ACCRA (the American Chamber of Commerce 
                                                 
8 In addition to these categories, there are others that may prove fruitful in future research, including: 
restrictions on alcohol advertising, alcohol education regulations in schools, requirements that parolees 
abstain from alcohol, restrictions on price promotions and other point-of-sale regulations such as “Happy 
Hours,” laws that assign liability to bar owners for serving intoxicated persons, alcohol-involved driving 
regulations, fines and penalties for alcohol violations, and others.  To our knowledge these regulations have 
not been studied extensively in the context of crime or violence outcomes (other than crime and violence 
related to driving under the influence, which is substantial but not in the scope of our review), so we do not 
discuss them here. 
    p.14  
Researchers Association, now known as the Council on Community Economic Research, 
or C2ER).  Kenkel (2005) also finds that taxes are more than fully shifted to prices using 
original survey data from before and after a large alcohol tax hike in Alaska.  Finally, a 
focus on alcohol taxes has substantial policy relevance as several states have debated and 
implemented significant increases in alcohol taxes in the past few years. 
  There is a now enormous body of evidence showing an inverse relationship 
between alcohol taxes and various measures of alcohol consumption; it has been 
reviewed extensively elsewhere (Chaloupka et al. 2002; Cook and Moore 2001; and 
others).  Some of this evidence comes from cross-sectional studies that use tax-induced 
price variation (Grossman et al. 1987, 1994; Coate and Grossman 1988; and others), but 
some of the earliest work on this topic used more credible panel data evaluation methods.  
Cook and Tauchen (1982), for example, showed that increases in state liquor taxes 
significantly reduced mortality from cirrhosis of the liver, a common proxy for chronic 
heavy drinking.  This study effectively introduced the two-way fixed effects design to 
studies of alcohol control policies, and it has become the standard for these types of 
evaluations.  Although some research has called the relationship between state beer taxes 
and alcohol consumption into question, particularly for young adults (see, Dee 1999; 
Mast et al. 1999; and others), other recent research has confirmed that tax-induced price 
increases for ethanol are associated with decreases in drinking (Cook and Moore 2001; 
Carpenter et al. 2007; and others). 
Several studies in economics by Markowitz and colleagues have used the inverse 
relationship between alcohol taxes and consumption to estimate models of the effect of 
alcohol consumption on violence by using alcohol taxes as instruments or by directly 
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estimating the reduced-form association between alcohol taxes and individual measures 
of violence.  Markowitz and Grossman (1998), for example, using one cross section of 
data from the 1976 National Family Violence Survey, found that state excise taxes on 
beer were significantly negatively related to the probability of child abuse.  In a related 
study Markowitz and Grossman (2000) added data from the 1985 wave of the same 
survey, which allowed them to estimate the sensitivity of the beer tax estimates to the 
inclusion of state fixed effects (thus identifying the effects of beer taxes from changes in 
state tax rates).  They found that beer taxes were negatively related to child abuse 
committed by women, but these results were only statistically significant when state fixed 
effects were excluded.  These studies do not include direct information on alcohol 
consumption, so the first stage relationship cannot be directly tested.  Markowitz (2000b) 
also examined spousal violence using the 1985, 1986, and 1987 waves of the National 
Family Violence Survey.  In models with individual fixed effects, she estimated that a 1% 
increase in price would reduce abuse aimed at wives by 5.34%.  Markowitz (2005) 
analyzes panel data on individuals from the 1992, 1993, and 1994 National Crime 
Victimization Surveys.  She finds that higher beer taxes have a (marginally) significant 
inverse relationship with physical assault but no substantive relationship with rape/sexual 
assault or robbery.  Markowitz (2001a) uses data from the 1989 and 1992 cross sections 
of the International Victimization Survey.  Controlling for the country-specific price of 
alcohol, she finds that these prices exhibit significant negative associations with the rates 
of assault, robbery, and sexual assault against women in the cross-section but that the 
associations are no longer statistically significant when country fixed effects are included 
in the regressions. 
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Markowitz and colleagues have also used similar strategies to relate beer taxes to 
violence among youths and young adults.  Markowitz (2001b), for example, uses data 
from the 1991, 1993, and 1995 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's Youth Risk 
Behavior Surveys (YRBS) to examine the relationship between alcohol use and the 
probability of being in a physical fight or carrying a weapon.  An advantage of the YRBS 
data is that they include information on youth drinking participation and heavy episodic 
drinking.  Using beer prices as instruments for youth drinking, Markowitz estimates that 
alcohol consumption significantly increases the probability of being in a physical fight 
but does not affect weapon-carrying behavior.  However, the first-stage and reduced-form 
relationships are estimated entirely from cross-sectional variation across states (net of 
state economic and religious characteristics).  Finally, Grossman and Markowitz (2001), 
using data from the 1989, 1990, and 1991 Core Alcohol and Drug Surveys of College 
students, find that state beer taxes are inversely related to the probability that college 
students reported getting into trouble with the police, being involved in property damage, 
getting into a verbal or physical fight, and being involved in violence.  They control 
directly for observed measures of anti-drinking sentiment in a state (such as religiosity) 
but do not include state (or other area) fixed effects in their models. 
In a related analysis, using data on individuals age 12 and older from the 1991 
National Household Survey on Drug Abuse, Saffer (2001) found that state beer taxes 
were significantly and inversely related to the probability of being arrested, the 
probability of engaging in property crime, the probability of engaging in property damage, 
and the probability of an individual using force to obtain something from someone.  
These effects were generally larger for youths under age 21.  Apart from individual 
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demographic characteristics, however, no other state policies or economic/demographic 
characteristics were included in the model except for state drug control spending. 
Arguably the most compelling direct evidence that higher alcohol taxes would 
reduce crime rates comes from a series of panel evaluations.  The first of these was 
conducted by Cook and Moore (1993), who regressed state violent crime rates for the 
period 1979–1987 on state excise taxes on beer, state fixed effects, and year fixed effects.  
In this parsimonious specification, they found a significant inverse relationship between a 
state’s beer tax and rates of rape and robbery (but not homicide or assault) within the 
state.  They did not consider property or nuisance crimes, however, and they did not 
control for other state demographic characteristics or other relevant prices or policies.  To 
the extent that these omitted characteristics were invariant within states over this period, 
however, the inclusion of state fixed effects largely shields Cook and Moore's 1993 study 
from these criticisms.   
More recently, Desimone (2001) effectively replicates and extends the findings of 
Cook and Moore (1993), despite the fact that Desimone's focus is on the money price of 
cocaine, not alcohol.  Using panel data on crimes in 29 large cities for the period 1981–
1995, Desimone estimates fixed-effects models that include controls for the excise tax on 
beer in addition to a host of city-level demographic characteristics such as the local age 
structure, unemployment rates, per capita income, the fraction that is female, and the 
fraction that is racial and ethnic minorities.  Like Cook and Moore (1993), he too finds 
that beer taxes are significantly negatively related to rape, and he also finds a significant 
negative association between beer taxes and rates of assault, larceny, and motor vehicle 
theft. 
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Finally, Matthews et al. (2006) and Sivarajasingam et al. (2006) study the 
relationship between beer prices and rates of injury-related violence using a panel of 
emergency department (ED) admissions over the period 1995–2000 in England and 
Wales.  They estimated fixed-effects models of outcomes and found that higher beer 
prices were significantly associated with lower rates of violence-related injury as proxied 
by ED admissions, consistent with a causal relationship between alcohol prices and 
violence.  These studies did not, however, address the mechanisms that drive regional or 
temporal price variations in beer. 
 
Critiques of the literature on tax/price restrictions 
Although the literature on alcohol taxes and criminal outcomes is extensive, most studies 
focus exclusively on violent crimes, so much less is known about the impact of alcohol 
taxes on nuisance or property crimes.  In addition, these studies cannot disentangle crime 
commission from criminal victimization since taxes should theoretically affect 
consumption among both populations. 
A more serious problem is that over the 1980s and 1990s (the period studied in 
most existing research) there were very few changes in state alcohol tax rates, making it 
difficult to precisely measure the effect of taxes on drinking and crime using models with 
fixed effects.  Therefore much of the research using taxes to identify the effects of 
alcohol on crime—particularly the studies using individual level data to examine 
violence—has been cross-sectional, which raises standard concerns that unobserved 
factors associated with both the level of the state’s beer tax and the state’s crime rate 
cannot be ruled out as an alternative explanation.  This critique has been previously 
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articulated by Dee (2001) and others in the context of youths.  A related issue is that since 
alcohol taxes affect everyone within the taxed jurisdiction there is no clean way to define 
within-area treatment and control groups that would make it possible to difference out 
these possible biases. 
  Indeed, a central question for evaluating the usefulness of tax/price strategies is: 
what causes the observed variation in the level of alcohol taxes across space and time?  
Studies of taxes and prices may be biased if population preferences about alcohol control 
(or changes in these preferences) are correlated with tax rates (or changes in these rates).  
Arguably, these preferences are more likely problematic for evaluations of direct 
restrictions on spatial and temporal alcohol availability (reviewed below), in part because 
concern about alcohol-related problems directly underlies many of those policies.  Taxes 
are somewhat shielded from this concern because they are often imposed as revenue-
raising devices.  Researchers must still be careful, however, because other determinants 
of crime rates such as resources available to police are also likely to be affected by 
budget shortfalls. 
 
Overall evaluation: tax/price restrictions 
Alcohol taxes in real terms have been falling steadily for decades, and economists 
commonly argue that alcohol taxes are “too low” (Manning et al. 1989; Cook 2007; and 
others).  Economic theory predicts that higher alcohol taxes should reduce both alcohol 
consumption and crime, to the extent that crime is caused by drinking.  Yet the evidence 
on the effects of alcohol taxes has been limited by the fact that there have not been many 
significant changes in the rate at which alcohol is taxed.  As a result, most of the papers 
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in the literature on the effect of alcohol taxes on violence are identified off cross-sectional 
variation, so omitted variables bias is a serious concern.  However, the two studies that 
leverage within-state variation find that alcohol taxes are negatively related to rates of 
various violent crimes.  Several recent alcohol tax increases may be fruitful subjects for 
future panel evaluations of the effects of taxes on alcohol consumption crime and may 
help to shed light on previous debates in this literature about the importance of price. 
 
5.2 Age-based alcohol restrictions 
One of the most direct forms of alcohol regulation in the United States and elsewhere is 
the minimum legal drinking age (MLDA).  Most economists view drinking-age policies 
as affecting the full price of obtaining alcohol.  Studies of age-based restrictions benefit 
from several advantages.  First, like alcohol taxes, they are highly policy-relevant. The 
country has been actively engaged in a debate about the appropriateness of an age-21 
drinking age, led by the Amethyst Initiative, a group of college and university leaders 
who have called for a re-examination of U.S. minimum drinking age policies.  Second, 
studies of drinking ages benefit from naturally sharp predictions about which groups of 
people should be affected by the policy in question: youths under the drinking age should 
have their consumption (and by implication, criminal activity) constrained by the MLDA, 
while youths at or above the drinking age should be largely unaffected.  Third, drinking 
age studies benefit from numerous changes in the drinking age, which can be used to 
estimate the effects of age-based alcohol regulations.  In the early 1970s, for example, all 
states had an MLDA of 21, but later that decade several states experimented with 
reducing the MLDA to 18, 19, or 20.  In response to research showing that youth alcohol-
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related fatalities increased following these age-based liberalizations, the federal 
government passed the 1984 Uniform Minimum Drinking Age Act, which required states 
to adopt an age-21 MLDA or risk losing 10% of their federally provided highway funds.  
By 1988, all states had returned to an MLDA of 21.  Because states adopted lower and 
then higher drinking ages in a staggered fashion (i.e., different states changed their laws 
in different years), it is possible to leverage within-state variation in the drinking age for 
identification.  Moreover, the age-based criteria for the laws allows researchers to use 
people too young or too old to be affected by the laws as a control group. 
  Given the strengths of age-based research designs, it is not surprising that the 
effect of these laws on alcohol consumption has been clearly documented.  Multiple 
studies have shown that exposure to a lower drinking age increased both drinking 
participation and heavy episodic drinking.  Using pooled cross sections of reports of 
alcohol consumption by high school seniors from the school-based Monitoring the Future 
(MTF) study of 1976–1992, Dee (1999) found that exposure to a permissive drinking age 
significantly increased drinking participation and heavy episodic drinking; this result was 
confirmed in analyses of other policies that also used MTF data (see, e.g., DiNardo and 
Lemieux 2001 and Carpenter et al. 2007).   Cook and Moore (2001) found a similar result 
using data on young adults from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youths.  Multiple 
studies have also shown that states’ drinking age experiments were predictably associated 
with significant changes in alcohol-related traffic fatalities, which is partly what 
prompted the 1984 federal action (see Wagenaar and Toomey 2001 for a comprehensive 
review).   
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  Two studies have documented that the state drinking age changes—in addition to 
affecting alcohol use—also affected crime.  Using age-specific arrest data from the 
Uniform Crime Reports, Joksch and Jones (1993) found that increasing the drinking age 
reduced nuisance crimes and simple assaults among young adults in the affected age 
groups.  Carpenter (2005) also found that drinking age increases were associated with 
significant reductions in arrests for nuisance crimes among youths in the targeted group.  
Taken together, these two studies suggest a causal relationship between alcohol 
availability, alcohol consumption, and the commission of some types of crime. 
  More recently, Carpenter and Dobkin (2009b) used a different approach to 
evaluate drinking ages and their effect on alcohol consumption and crime.  Specifically, 
their regression discontinuity (RD) design uses the fact that the costs of obtaining alcohol 
fall discretely at the MLDA.  Since all other observed and unobserved determinants of 
crime are likely to trend smoothly across the MLDA threshold, the observed changes in 
drinking and crime precisely at age 21 (net of birthday effects) can be used to identify the 
effect of easier alcohol availability on crime.  Using alcohol consumption data from the 
2001–2007 California Health Interview Surveys (which gives subjects’ exact age in 
months at the time of they were interviewed), they find that drinking participation 
increases sharply at age 21 by about 30%.
9  They then use data on the universe of arrests 
in California for the period 2000–2008 (including subjects’ exact age in days at time they 
were arrested) from the Monthly Arrest and Citation Register and find significant 
increases in arrest rates for nuisance and violent crimes precisely at age 21.  Assaults 
accounted for most of the sharp increase in arrests for violent crimes exactly at age 21.  
                                                 
9 In related work, Carpenter and Dobkin (2009a) also document a similar discontinuity nationally using 
data from the 1997-2003 National Health Interview Surveys. 
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The RD approach in Carpenter and Dobkin (2009) leverages an abrupt change in alcohol 
availability; as a result the estimates from this research design are less likely to be 
contaminated by population policy preferences than estimates from research designs that 
leverage statewide changes in policies regulating alcohol. 
  
Critiques of the literature on age-based restrictions 
Although studies of age-based restrictions on alcohol have several strengths, they also 
have limitations.  First, there is limited evidence on enforcement of drinking age laws, 
either historically or present day.  However, numerous researchers have documented the 
first-stage effect of age-based restrictions on alcohol consumption, somewhat easing this 
concern.  Second, most of the studies using age-based alcohol regulations use arrest data 
instead of reported crimes data (since the age of the offender is typically not known).  
This raises the usual concern  that alcohol use independently increases the probability of 
being arrested if one has committed a crime, thus resulting in an overstatement of the 
effect of age-based restrictions.  The fact that these studies generally find effects for some 
crime types but not others mitigates this concern somewhat. 
Third, the alcohol/crime relationship using variation in drinking age laws is 
complicated by the fact that individuals legally old enough to drink not only can obtain 
alcohol more cheaply, but also can obtain it in more places and venues (an additional 
dimension of the “full price” of alcohol).  This means that it is difficult to distinguish 
whether it is the alcohol consumption, the increased social interaction with other 
potentially intoxicated individuals, or the interaction of the two that is the key causal 
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determinant in increased crime.
10  Since very few large-scale surveys in the United States 
ask detailed questions about the location and circumstances of alcohol use, these age-
based studies usually cannot rule out the possibility that changes in both the quantity of 
alcohol consumed and the circumstances of consumption independently contribute to 
changes in the incidence of crime.   
  Finally, there are two related critical issues dealing with external validity and 
whether drinking age laws induce temporary displacements of drinking and crime 
outcomes or permanent reductions.  Carpenter and Dobkin's RD design suggests that the 
increases in crime attributable to easier alcohol access at age 21 persist through at least 
age 23, though extrapolation away from the discontinuity for the purposes of informing 
policy is particularly difficult in this setting.  Indeed, one of the most salient challenges to 
age-based designs is that their key advantage—tight information about which individuals 
should and should not have been affected by the restrictions according to single year of 
age (in the panel evaluation design) or exact age (in the RD design)—comes at a cost: 
questionable generalizability beyond young adults. That is, it is not obvious that a 
proportional reduction in alcohol consumption at age 15, 35, or 50 would have the same 
effects on crime as indicated in the drinking age studies (whose focus is ages 18–21).  
The weight of this limitation, however, is somewhat mitigated by the fact that the age 
profiles for both drinking and crime peak in late adolescence and early adulthood.  This 
                                                 
10 This limitation is less salient for the evidence on property and nuisance crimes, since they are less likely 
to involve interpersonal interactions.   
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Overall evaluation: age-based alcohol restrictions 
In the 1970s and 1980s many states lowered their drinking age to 18 or 19 before raising 
it back to 21; the minimum legal drinking age in every state has been set at 21 since then.  
The literature has produced a great deal of evidence that lowering the drinking age would 
increase youth drinking, and results from both panel evaluations and a regression 
discontinuity design indicate that lowering the drinking age would also increase several 
types of crime, including violent crime, committed by young adults. 
 
5.3 Place-based restrictions on the availability and density of alcohol outlets 
There are numerous studies  in the addiction, criminology, and public health literature 
that have found a strong spatial relationship between alcohol and crime.  If these 
correlations are due to an underlying causal relationship between alcohol availability and 
crime, then local restrictions on the availability of alcohol–such as prohibiting the sale of 
alcohol in residential zones or within a certain radius of schools–may be effective crime 
control tools. 
  Studies of this type typically use sophisticated geographic information system 
(GIS) methods and very detailed data on locations of alcohol outlets and the places where 
crimes are committed to estimate spatial correlations.  Since these studies typically focus 
on crime committed in very small areas around where alcohol is available, concerns 
                                                 
11 Note that if age-based alcohol control policies have longer-term effects on drinking outcomes (as 
suggested by Norberg et al. 2009 and Kaestner and Yarnoff 2009), then there may also be an additional 
rationale for age-based restrictions. 
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about ecological inference problems are mitigated.  Also, some of the studies allow 
disaggregation by type of alcohol outlet (e.g., liquor store versus bar) to provide more 
detailed evidence on which types of outlets are more strongly associated with crime.  The 
pharmacological evidence reviewed above suggests that on-premises outlets should be 
more strongly related to aggression-related crimes than off-premises outlets in the 
presence of a true causal effect.   
Most of the early research using spatial variation relied on cross-sectional 
variation in alcohol outlets in particular cities.  One of the earliest and most often cited 
studies of this kind was conducted by Scribner et al. (1995) using detailed information on 
the location of assaults in 75 communities in Los Angeles.  They found that one 
additional alcohol outlet was associated with 3.4 additional violent assaults (from a base 
of 570).  In a related study, Scribner et al. (1999) examined 155 neighborhoods in New 
Orleans and found that a 10% increase in off-premises alcohol outlets was significantly 
associated with a 2.4% higher homicide rate.
12  Livingston (2008) performed a similar 
study for 223 neighborhoods in Melbourne, Australia, and found statistically significant 
relationships between general alcohol outlet density and assault and between on-premises 
alcohol outlet density and assault, but other research that has disaggregated alcohol 
outlets by type has reached different conclusions.
13  A 2006 study by Gruenewald and 
colleagues, for example, examined California hospital admission for assaults and found 
that assaults were more common in areas with many alcohol outlets that required off-
premises consumption such as liquor stores than in areas with many outlets where alcohol 
                                                 
12 Not all such studies have found similar effects, however.  Gorman et al. (1998) perform a similar analysis 
for New Jersey and find no spatial relationship between alcohol outlets and violence. 
13 We review only a handful of representative articles from the public health and criminology literature here.  
For others see, for example, Lipton and Gruenewald 2002; Roncek and Maier 1991; Zhu, Gorman, and 
Horel 2004; Gorman et al. 1998.  
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is consumed on the premises, such as bars.  In fact, Gruenewald et al. (2006) found that 
bar density increased the assault rate only in low-income poor communities and rural 
communities, but not in stable, wealthy communities. 
The relationships between space-based restrictions, alcohol consumption, and 
crime-related outcomes have also been studied extensively in the context of college 
students.  Multiple studies have used the Harvard College Alcohol Study (CAS)—a large, 
nationally representative survey of college youths' risk behaviors related to alcohol use—
to show that proximity of the campus to alcohol outlets is significantly related to drinking 
participation and heavy episodic drinking (see, e.g., Chaloupka and Wechsler 1996; 
Weitzman et al. 2002).  Wechsler et al. (2002) fielded a telephone survey of households 
around college campuses with varying rates of binge drinking.  They found that people 
living near college campuses with high binge-drinking rates reported significantly more 
nuisance crimes such as drunkenness, vandalism, public urination, and other disorderly 
conduct than people living farther away.  
Of course, a significant issue with these cross-sectional analyses of spatial 
variation in liquor outlets is that unobserved local factors that contribute to both crime 
and alcohol outlet density may bias the estimates presented in these studies.  Researchers 
have tried to address this challenge in a variety of ways.  The most common approach is 
to include tract-level controls for multiple observable dimensions of local neighborhood 
quality.  Adjusting for observable differences between neighborhoods in this fashion may 
reduce the problem of omitted variables bias. 
An alternative way to address the problem that neighborhood characteristics are 
probably correlated with both liquor outlet availability and crime is to identify an 
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instrumental variable that affects liquor availability but does not directly affect crime (i.e., 
a variable that only affects crime through its effect on liquor outlets).  Gyimah-Brempong 
(2003) uses the number of gas stations in a census tract as an instrument for alcohol outlet 
density in Detroit, with the idea that the fixed costs of operating an alcohol outlet are 
lower in commercial zones.  He uses median rent as an additional instrument with the 
reasoning that higher rents will make it more expensive to operate an alcohol outlet.  He 
finds that both uncorrected and corrected specifications suggest a strong positive 
relationship between alcohol outlets and property and violent crimes.  A difficulty with 
this approach is that it is not clear that the instruments satisfy the necessary exclusion 
restrictions for valid identification. 
A third approach for addressing concerns about omitted variables bias is to 
examine how the opening and closing of alcohol outlets affects crime rates.  Teh (2008) 
employs this type of strategy in an event-study framework using data on liquor outlets in 
Los Angeles.  Her empirical specifications include area fixed effects, which ease 
concerns about the time-invariant characteristics of neighborhoods that might affect both 
crime rates and the probability that a liquor store is located in the neighborhood.  In her 
main specifications the effects of liquor availability are identified from liquor store 
openings and closings.  She finds that both property and violent crimes increase 
immediately after an alcohol outlet opens, and these effects are larger in the immediate 
vicinity of the outlet and in low-income neighborhoods. 
 
Critiques of the space-based literature on alcohol outlets 
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Despite these innovations for addressing the evaluation problem in the context of spatial 
alcohol availability and crime, several challenges remain.  First, it is not obvious that the 
designs used in this literature adequately address concerns about omitted variables bias.  
As noted above, the cross-sectional comparisons are vulnerable to omitted variables bias. 
Even the panel and interrupted time-series designs in this literature may still produce 
biased estimates if changing population preferences toward alcohol contribute to political 
processes that generate spatial restrictions. 
Second, the mechanisms underlying any crime reduction in these studies are not 
well understood.  For example, spatial studies face the challenge that alcohol outlets may 
attract crime (in addition to or instead of causing it), so estimates from this design may 
overstate the benefits of reducing liquor store or bar density.  Similarly, it is difficult to 
disentangle whether it is variation in alcohol consumption, variation in social interaction 
around liquor outlets, or the interaction of the two that causes crime.  Also, little is known 
about how liquor store placement and alcohol outlet density affect alcohol consumption. 
Most survey data on alcohol use are not well suited for these types of detailed spatial 
analyses since surveys generally do not ask about the precise location of consumption.  
Studies have used data on the location of alcohol sales (Stevenson et al. 1999), though 
this may be a poor measure of the location of consumption, particularly for consumption 
away from the location where the alcohol was purchased. 
Third, most studies in the spatial availability literature have focused on violent 
crime; a more comprehensive analysis of all crime types would be useful, particularly an 
examination of alcohol-related crimes (e.g., public intoxication) to strengthen the 
evidence that alcohol outlets actually increase consumption.  Fourth, most studies lack 
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information on spatial dimensions of police enforcement.  Such studies may produce 
biased estimates of the effects of, say, liquor outlets on crime if enforcement is 
systematically higher around liquor outlets (either at a point in time or over time in a way 
that is correlated with alcohol outlet openings and closings).  Fifth, studies in this 
literature cannot disentangle whether alcohol use causes crime commission, criminal 
victimization, or both.  Having an alcohol outlet in a neighborhood could plausibly 
increase the alcohol consumption of both perpetrators and victims, and there is no way to 
separately identify these two effects. 
Finally, and perhaps most important, few of the studies in the spatial availability 
literature provide evidence on the critical question of whether the policies simply shift the 
location of alcohol consumption and crime or whether they actually affect the overall 
crime rate.  While social welfare may be enhanced in the presence of consumption or 
crime displacement across space (if, for example, alcohol consumed and crime 
committed away from schools were less socially harmful than the same level of 
consumption and crime near schools), a full accounting of the costs and benefits of these 
policies requires a complete understanding of the total effects of the regulations on 
outcomes. 
 
Overall evaluation: space-based regulations on alcohol outlets 
The existing evidence suggests a link between alcohol outlets and some types of crime, 
but strong conclusions are not yet warranted because studies of spatial availability 
restrictions have yet to convincingly overcome key identification problems.  Even the 
best studies in this literature do not establish that the opening of an alcohol outlet will 
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increase crime rather than just attract it.  We conclude that the evidence is not sufficient 
to establish that spatial availability restrictions are effective at reducing crime. 
 
5.4 Temporal restrictions on the hours and/or days of alcohol sales 
In addition to explicitly space-based regulations, there are also several types of alcohol 
regulations that specify when alcohol can be purchased or consumed.  These include laws 
that prevent Sunday sales of alcohol in the United States and Australia and Saturday sales 
in Scandinavia, and laws that regulate the hours of operation of venues where alcohol is 
consumed, such as bars and restaurants. 
Studies of temporal availability restrictions have the advantage that there have 
been many changes in laws governing when alcohol can be sold.  This allows researchers 
to implement fairly compelling pre-/post- and interrupted time-series designs, thus 
reducing some concerns about omitted variables bias to the extent that time-invariant 
unobservables are controlled for through the inclusion of location fixed effects.  Since 
these types of policies are routinely debated in many jurisdictions, studies that can 
evaluate their efficacy are of particular interest.  
Much of the research exploiting temporal variation in alcohol availability has 
focused on repealing prohibitions of alcohol sales, particularly restrictions on Sunday 
alcohol sales.  Commonly termed "blue laws," these policies are still prevalent in many 
areas in the southern United States.  In the past decade, however, several places have 
lifted their Sunday sales restrictions, in part to increase state revenue from sales taxes.  
Evidence suggests that such policy liberalizations do increase alcohol sales.  Stehr (2008) 
uses aggregate data on beer, wine, and spirits sales to study the effect of various U.S. 
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states’ repeal of Sunday sales restrictions.  His fixed-effects estimates indicate that 
Sunday sales policies significantly increased spirits sales.  Evidence that such policies 
affect actual alcohol consumption (as distinct from alcohol sales) is more limited, though 
Carpenter and Eisenberg (2009) show that Sunday sales liberalization in Ontario, Canada, 
increased Sunday-specific drinking by 7–15%, with some evidence of substitution away 
from consumption on Fridays and Saturdays.
14 
Evidence that these types of temporal restrictions on alcohol sales and availability 
reduce crime rates is fairly limited.  Ligon and Thyer (1993) showed that a ban on 
Sunday alcohol sales reduced arrests for driving under the influence (DUI).  McMillan 
and Lapham (2006), using data on day-specific traffic fatalities in New Mexico before 
and after its 1995 Sunday sales liberalization, found very large increases in Sunday 
fatalities, though more recent analyses have suggested far more modest effects (Maloney 
and Rudbeck 2009; Lovenheim and Steefel 2009).  A related series of papers by Smith 
(1988, 1990, and others) showed that increases in the hours/days of availability in 
Australia were associated with increases in alcohol-related fatalities. 
Some of the best evidence of the impact of temporal availability restrictions on 
crime rates comes from Scandinavia, where multiple policy changes make it possible to 
implement relatively compelling interrupted time-series designs.
15  Olsson and Wikstrom 
(1982) studied Sweden's short-term closing of its state monopoly liquor stores on 
Saturdays in the summer of 1981.  They found that offenses related to drunkenness, 
                                                 
14 Gruber and Hungerman (2008) examine earlier repeals of blue laws in the United States that increased a 
variety of economic activities on Sundays (not just alcohol sales).  While alcohol consumption was not the 
primary focus of their paper, they did find that blue law repeals increased drinking by 16 percent among 
individuals who had previously attended church services (and whose behavior would be most likely 
affected by the blue law repeal). 
15 In addition to the peer-reviewed studies on Scandinavian policy changes described here and in the next 
section, see the comprehensive treatment by Room (2002).  
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domestic disturbances, public disturbances, and assaults fell on both Saturdays and 
Sundays relative to other days of the week during the period of the experiment.  
Interestingly, they found no effects on outcomes related to vandalism, acute medical care, 
and road accidents, and there is also no evidence from this policy experiment that the 
reduction in Saturday availability reduced total alcohol consumption.  These results raise 
the possibility of across-day substitution (e.g., a displacement of consumption and/or 
crime from weekends to weekdays) and suggest the need for more detailed data on the 
circumstances of alcohol consumption.
16 
In a series of studies examining the effects of Sweden's staggered adoption of 
longer Saturday retail hours in its monopoly-run liquor stores (first in a limited 
geographic area in February 2000 and then countrywide in 2001), Norstrom and Skog 
(2003, 2005) found that increased alcohol availability was associated with modest 
increases in sales of beer and spirits (but not wine) of about 3.6% during both phases of 
the experiment.  The increased alcohol sales from the first liberalization (but not the 
second) were associated with significant increases in alcohol-involved driving, while 
assaults exhibited no significant change in either period.  Norstrom and Skog argue that 
the increase in drunk-driving arrests that resulted from the 2000 policy change is at least 
partly attributable to changes in police enforcement. They also note that such modest 
changes in overall alcohol sales make it difficult to precisely estimate the relationship 
between alcohol sales and assaults.  Norstrom and Skog did not examine whether their 
                                                 
16 The lack of effects on overall alcohol consumption from modest changes in the days or hours of sale is a 
common finding in this literature.  Duffy and Plant (1986), for example, studied Scotland’s 1976 alcohol 
liberalization, which extended bar closing hours from 10 p.m. until 11 p.m. and allowed “public houses” 
(not just bars in hotels) to be open on Sundays.  Using changes in alcohol-related outcomes in England and 
Wales as a control condition, they found no evidence that these temporal restrictions affected overall 
alcohol consumption or alcohol-related harm except for a reduction in public order offenses such as 
drunkenness. 
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outcomes exhibited cross-day substitution in response to the Saturday-specific increase in 
availability. 
Finally, we review studies of laws that regulate the hours of alcohol availability.  
Chikritzhs and Stockwell (2002) studied later closing times for bars in licensed hotels in 
Perth, Australia, using data on assaults reported to the police.  Over their 1991–1997 
sample period, about a quarter of hotels applied for and were granted a permit to extend 
alcohol sales from midnight until 1 a.m.  They found that, relative to hotels that were not 
granted such permits, hotels with extended trading hours exhibited significantly greater 
wholesale alcohol purchases (their proxy for increased alcohol consumption) and had 
significantly higher rates of assault in the immediate vicinity of the hotel.  Vingilis et al. 
(2007) studied the effects of Ontario, Canada’s 1996 extension of its bar closing hours 
from 1 a.m. to 2 a.m.  They examined administrative data on hospital admissions for each 
hour of availability from 11 p.m. to 3 a.m. for the four years before and three years after 
the policy change.  They found reductions in motor vehicle collision admissions between 
11 p.m. and midnight and between 1 and 2 a.m. but no significant change for the 2–3 a.m. 
period, which they attribute to concurrent increased enforcement and road safety 
initiatives.  For other types of injuries not related to motor vehicle collisions, they found 
significant increases for the 2–3 a.m. period.
17 
One of the strongest examples of this type of research used the adoption of 
mandatory bar and restaurant closing hours in Sao Paolo, Brazil.  Biderman et al. (2009 
forthcoming) use a difference-in-differences design to examine the effects of these “dry” 
                                                 
17 A study related to research on bar closing hours is by Jackson and Owens (2009), who use the extension 
of late-night hours of Metro rail service in Washington, D.C., which allowed individuals to stay at bars and 
restaurants until those establishments closed.  They show that a series of these policy changes predictably 
affected DUIs and alcohol-related crimes.  
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laws on violent crime.  Between March 2001 and August 2004, 16 of 39 municipalities in 
the Sao Paolo metropolitan area prohibited alcohol sales during the late-night and early-
morning hours; prior to this most bars were allowed to remain open 24 hours a day.  In 
models with city and period fixed effects as well as controls for varying city/period 
demographic characteristics, police enforcement, and lags in the homicide rate, Biderman 
et al. found that adoption of the dry law was associated with a statistically significant 
reduction in both homicides and battery of about 10%.
18 
Changes in temporal restrictions are not uniformly effective, however, as 
evidenced by recent evaluations of another high-profile policy experiment regarding bar 
closing hours that was intended to reduce crime—England and Wales's Licensing Act of 
2003—but that have not returned uniformly strong evidence of crime reductions (Hough 
and Hunter 2008; Humphreys and Eisner 2010; and others).  That policy liberalized 
restrictions on bar closing hours and encouraged licensed premises to apply for rights to 
serve alcohol later than previously allowed.  The rationale for the policy was to reduce 
the problems associated with a fixed, common bar closing time, which generally resulted 
in large numbers of inebriated individuals coming into close contact with each other in 
small spaces.  Staggering bar closing hours, it was thought, would dramatically reduce 
crimes such as assaults that occur at very high rates when all bars close at once in the 
early hours of the morning.  Results have generally shown no meaningful effects on 
either alcohol consumption or measures of violent crime (Hough and Hunter 2008).  
Some scholars have noted that because the law did not require staggered closing hours 
                                                 
18 Biderman et al.’s (2009) results confirm the findings of an earlier single-city analysis of the Brazilian city 
of Diadema, which found that homicides fell significantly after the imposition of a mandatory 11 p.m. 
closing hour (Duailibi et al. 2007). 
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but rather made them voluntary, in reality there was rather limited variation in the 
treatment of interest (Treno 2010; Frattaroli 2010). 
 
Critiques of the literature on temporal availability restrictions 
Studies of temporal availability restrictions have several of the same limitations as the 
spatial availability research described above.  While these studies arguably do a better job 
of dealing with the possibility of omitted variables correlated with both the temporal 
availability restriction and outcomes, one might still worry that changing attitudes 
towards alcohol will drive the adoption of these policies and also directly affect outcomes.  
Though Sunday sales liberalizations seem to be driven by a desire to increase state tax 
revenues, endogenous policy adoption may be an issue for the other studies examined in 
this subsection, such as the imposition of mandatory bar closing times in Brazil or 
liberalized/staggered bar closing times in England and Wales.
19  A related question about 
generalizability arises in examining changes in temporal availability restrictions:  while a 
handful of studies have examined the effects of changes in the days and hours of alcohol 
availability on alcohol consumption and DUI outcomes in the United States, none of 
these has examined crime or violence more generally.  The studies that do examine crime 
leverage policy changes in countries and time periods where the basic patterns of alcohol 
control and crime differ markedly from those in the United States. 
There are other limitations as well.  As with the spatial availability studies, the 
research on temporal restrictions provides almost no insight into how these policies affect 
the extent or conditions of alcohol consumption, as most evidence comes from imperfect 
                                                 
19 Duailibi et al. (2007) note, for example, that the mandatory bar closing hour policy in Diadema was 
instituted because the mayor was concerned about the high murder rate, and police records showed that 
most murders occurred in or near bars. 
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proxies such as aggregate sales.  And, like the spatial literature, most studies of 
restrictions on the days or hours of alcohol sales lack information on temporal 
dimensions of police enforcement.  If enforcement is systematically lower during the 
periods when alcohol sales are restricted, the observed effect of a change in temporal 
availability restrictions on crime will be dampened.  Studies in the temporal literature 
also cannot separately identify whether alcohol use causes crime commission, criminal 
victimization, or both.  Finally, and again perhaps most important, few of the temporal 
availability studies provide compelling evidence on whether the policies simply shift the 
timing of alcohol consumption and crime or permanently reduce them.   
 
Overall evaluation: temporal availability restrictions 
Research examining temporal restrictions on the hours and days on which alcohol may be 
sold share many of the strengths and weaknesses of studies that exploit detailed spatial 
variation in the availability of alcohol outlets.  These studies tend to examine a limited 
number of types of crime and do not address the broader question of whether temporal 
availability restrictions simply redistribute crime across different time periods or reduce it.  
We conclude that there is compelling evidence that temporal availability restrictions 
change the times at which crimes are committed, but that the evidence that they actually 
reduce overall alcohol consumption and crime rates is weaker. 
 
5.5 Other "circumstance" regulations not elsewhere classified and indirect evidence on 
alcohol and crime 
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The preceding sections reviewed evidence from studies of alcohol regulations that were 
either spatial or temporal in nature.  There are, in addition, other types of alcohol 
restrictions that combine elements of both.  These "circumstance" regulations control the 
conditions under which alcohol is made available and include alcohol rationing and 
privatizations of government liquor sales monopolies (which generally lead to increases 
in alcohol availability through increases in outlet density and reductions in prices).  In 
this section we also review a handful of studies that do not explicitly evaluate alcohol 
control policies but do provide important and useful evidence on the nature and extent of 
the causal links between alcohol availability, alcohol consumption, and the commission 
of crime. 
  One type of "circumstance" regulation that has been studied in the context of 
crime is drunk-driving policy.  Specifically, Carpenter (2008) examined the reduced-form 
relationship between age-targeted “zero tolerance” (ZT) drunk-driving laws and age-
specific crime (as proxied by age-specific arrests).
20  ZT laws were adopted by every U.S. 
state during the 1990s; they make it illegal for youths under age 21 to drive with any 
alcohol in their blood (the relevant standard for adults in most states at the time was a 
BAC of 0.08 or 0.10); thus, these laws dramatically lowered the relevant BAC threshold 
for youths under age 21 but had no independent effect on the legal environment for 
young adults over age 21.  Carpenter (2008) showed that adoption of ZT laws, which 
reduced youth drinking among 18–20 year-olds by 13% (Carpenter 2005), also reduced 
property and nuisance crime arrests among young adults age 18–20 by 5% but had no 
                                                 
20 Alcohol-involved driving regulations may be useful for future studies of alcohol and crime, but we are 
not aware of any research that has used them in this way other than that by Carpenter (2008). 
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effect on arrests among slightly older adults age 22–24 who were unaffected by ZT laws.  
He did not find significant effects on violent crime. 
  Another type of circumstance regulation is a local prohibition on alcohol (i.e., 
whether a city or county is “wet” or “dry”).  Such restrictions remain especially common 
in the southern United States.  Conlin, Dickert-Conlin, and Pepper (2005) studied the 
effects of changes in local prohibitions at the county level in Texas using data from 1978 
to 1996.  In fixed-effects models with county and year fixed effects, they found that a 
county's movement to “wet” status decreased illicit drug crimes (and mortality associated 
with illicit drug use).  They interpret this as evidence that alcohol and illicit drugs are 
substitutes. 
Several studies have examined large-scale reductions in alcohol consumption 
associated with major world or country-specific events.  During Russia's anti-alcohol 
campaign of 1985–1988, alcohol was banned in public places, prices quadrupled, and 
state production and sale of alcohol was dramatically limited.  Over this period, 
population alcohol consumption fell by 25%, and the homicide rate fell by about 40% 
(Shkolnikov and Nemtsov 1997).  Lenke (1982) reports on a series of studies in 
Scandinavia that have suggested a strong link between availability and crime using 
historical records.  First, he shows that alcohol rationing as part of a broader food 
shortage during World War I resulted in a two-thirds decline in alcohol consumption.  
This was soon followed by significant reductions in assault but overall increases in other 
types of crime.  Lenke also reports on the end of Sweden's rationing system in 1955, 
which led to a sharp increase in alcohol consumption of about 25% and a more modest 
increase in assaults (8%).  In another study, Lenke (1982) reports on a policy experiment 
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that introduced "middle-strong" beer into general food stores in 1965.  Prior to 1965, beer 
above a certain alcohol content could only be sold in government-run monopoly stores.  
From 1960 to 1970, alcohol consumption increased in Sweden by 40% and assaults 
increased by 50–100%, with particularly large increases among youths and in rural areas.  
Lenke reports similar patterns from a closely related policy experiment in Finland in 
1969.  Notably, however, when Sweden ended the sale of "middle-strong" beer in general 
food stores in 1977, alcohol consumption fell only modestly—on the order of 10%—and 
assaults did not fall.  These studies do not include explicit control groups, raising some 
concerns that the estimates may be biased. 
Temporary suspensions of alcohol availability associated with labor strikes 
affecting monopoly-run alcohol outlets have also provided strong evidence of a link 
between alcohol availability and crime.  Lenke (1982) reports on a three-month strike at 
the state monopoly liquor stores in Sweden in 1963.  During the strike (when alcohol was 
much more difficult to obtain), aggravated assault fell.  There were similar reductions in 
Finland during strikes by workers at state liquor stores in 1972, which caused an abrupt 
and large reduction in alcohol availability.  Over this period, it is estimated that alcohol 
consumption fell by 30%, with concomitant reductions in public drunkenness, resisting 
arrest, disturbing the peace, and aggravated assault.  Inflicted injuries as measured by 
admissions to emergency clinics for murder, manslaughter, assault, and battery also fell 
sharply coincident with the reduced availability (Makela 1980; Karaharju and Stjernvall 
1974; Takala 1973).  Similar strikes in Norway's monopoly liquor stores in 1978 also 
reduced alcohol consumption by 5–10% and reduced domestic violence (Horverak 1981, 
as reported in Room 1983).  Although these circumstances were not brought about by 
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intentional policy manipulations, the studies do provide strong evidence that liberalizing 
alcohol availability through increased retail availability would increase alcohol 
consumption and crime. 
  Finally, we note that several studies have shed light on a possible link between 
alcohol and crime while not directly studying alcohol control or alcohol consumption.  
Dahl and DellaVigna (2009), for example, find that the release of violent movies is 
associated with reductions in violent crime during evening hours; they hypothesize that 
movie-going may displace alcohol consumption, which would result in fewer acts of 
violence if alcohol use causes violent behavior.  Rees and Schnepel (2009) examine the 
relationship between college football games and crime, finding that cities hosting 
Division I-A football games experience sharp increases in arrests for assault, vandalism, 
and disorderly conduct on game days.  Importantly, they find some of the largest effects 
on liquor law violations which, combined with anecdotal evidence, suggests that alcohol 
may play a causal role in game-day crime.  Card and Dahl (2009) study the effects of 
emotional cues on domestic violence; they examine the days on which professional 
football games are played and show that unexpected home-team losses significantly 
increase acts of domestic violence.  Again, alcohol use may be one mechanism 
contributing to this effect.  These and other studies suggest alcohol is a substantial cause 
of violence and that situation-specific regulations may be effective at reducing alcohol 
consumption and some of the crime it generates. 
 
6. Common Limitations and Proposed Future Directions 
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While each of the literatures we have reviewed above has specific strengths and 
weaknesses, there are also some broad gaps in the literature on alcohol control policy and 
crime that are worth mentioning in the hope of spurring researchers to address them. 
One of the most serious gaps in the literature is that little is known about how 
much and in what ways alcohol regulations affect alcohol consumption.  Understanding 
how regulations affect the levels, patterns, and circumstances of alcohol use would be of 
substantial value.  For example, information on how each regulation affects total drinking, 
binge drinking, and drinking by high-risk groups would provide more insight into the 
mechanisms through which the policies reduce crime (if indeed they do) and would 
subsequently allow policymakers to craft more effective regulations.  An additional 
benefit of having estimates of how different policies affect the level of alcohol 
consumption by different groups (e.g., heavy versus light drinkers) is that we would be 
able to better characterize specific policies’ social costs.  Existing evidence suggests that 
even “heavy” and “problem” drinkers respond to price (Cook and Tauchen 1982), though 
which groups are particularly sensitive to tax-induced price changes is not well 
documented. 
Another limitation of the literature reviewed here is that it is focused largely on 
homicides and other violent crimes such as rape and assault, presumably because of the 
strong pharmacological links between alcohol and aggression.  Property crimes (e.g., 
larceny, motor vehicle theft), drug crimes (e.g., possession, sale, use), and social nuisance 
crimes (e.g., vandalism, disorderly conduct, prostitution) have received much less 
attention, perhaps because they are considered less serious.  However, these crimes are 
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far more common than violent crimes, so failing to examine them closely may lead us to 
miss a substantial part of the social costs of alcohol consumption. 
A final shortcoming of the entire literature on alcohol and crime is the 
disproportionate focus on alcohol’s role in the commission of crime as opposed to 
criminal victimization (with the exception of homicide victimization, for which there is a 
substantial public health and criminology literature).  The lack of research attention to 
how alcohol affects the probability of criminal victimization is probably due in part to the 
lack of high-quality victimization data.  The National Crime Victimization Surveys, for 
example, provide some of the best data for studying criminal victimization, but they do 
not include geographic identifiers.  It is not possible therefore to conduct state/year panel 
evaluations of the effects of alcohol control policies on criminal victimization. Yet even 
with credible victimization data there is another methodological and conceptual challenge 
for understanding how alcohol regulations affect criminal victimization: specifically, 
most alcohol control policies probably affect the alcohol consumption of both criminals 
and their victims, but it is impossible to distinguish between these two causal 
mechanisms without very rich individual-level data.  Beer taxes, for example, likely 
affect drinking among both individuals committing crime and their victims, as do spatial 
and temporal restrictions on alcohol availability.    
There are at least two recent encouraging developments for researchers interested 
in the important question of how alcohol affects crime.  The first is that excellent data 
sources such as the National Epidemiologic Survey on Alcohol Related Conditions 
(NESARC) are becoming more broadly available.  The NESARC is a two-wave panel 
(completed in 2001 and 2004/05) of the alcohol consumption behaviors of over 40,000 
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adult residents of the United States performed by the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse 
and Alcoholism (NIAAA).  Limited-access data files with geographic identifiers will be 
made available to researchers.  These data are likely to be particularly useful for 
understanding the settings in which alcohol is consumed because the survey includes 
detailed questions about the location, timing, and frequency of recent alcohol 
consumption.  Most U.S. surveys such as the National Health Interview Survey contain 
far less detailed information on alcohol consumption and/or lack a longitudinal 
component.  Another useful dataset increasingly being used by economists is the National 
Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS).  It contains detailed information on crimes 
known to the police (not just crimes resulting in an arrest) and includes among other 
variables one that records if the crime involved alcohol.  With this information, NIBRS 
can support state/year panel evaluations of alcohol control regulations on various 
measures of crime and violence, including incidents of criminal victimization.  Finally, 
we are encouraged by the increased availability of large administrative datasets at the 
state and federal levels on mortality, arrests, and hospital and emergency room 
admissions; they broaden the set of outcomes that researchers can examine in the 
contexts of crime and violence. 
A second encouraging development is the substantial number of recent state- and 
province-level policy changes.  Some of the policy changes are the consequence of the 
recent economic downturn, which seriously diminished state budget coffers and led many 
states to increase excise taxes on beer, wine, and spirits as revenue-raising devices.  For 
example, the Tax Foundation lists 19 legislated increases in state beer taxes in the period 
2002–2008, including several very large tax hikes (e.g., in Alaska from 35 cents to $1.07 
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per gallon in 2002); in the entire prior decade there were just 15 increases (and most of 
these were small).  These changes are particularly welcome for analyses of the effects of 
beer taxes, since one limitation of research in this area is that there historically have been 
too few large-scale state-specific tax increases to get precise estimates from panel 
regression models (Dee 1999).  Budget shortfalls have also led 12 states since 2000 to 
repeal longstanding restrictions on Sunday alcohol sales (Stehr 2007).  The staggered 
timing of adoption of these policies at the state level should prove useful for 
understanding not only how these regulations affect alcohol consumption but also how 
they affect crime.  Finally, a handful of U.S. states and Canadian provinces have begun to 
privatize their systems of liquor control.  Iowa, West Virginia, and Alberta did so in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s with dramatic effect on alcohol sales (Holder and Wagenaar 
1995; Cook 2007).  More recently, British Columbia undertook a partial privatization that 
has resulted in very large increases in alcohol availability; when combined with detailed 
information on consumption, violence, and crime, this should provide useful new insight 
into both the structural relationships underlying alcohol and crime as well as direct policy 
guidance for other states, such as Virginia, that are actively debating privatization 
(Stockwell et al. 2009). 
In summary, the increased availability of high-quality survey and administrative 
data and the numerous recent policy changes suggest that future work on alcohol 
regulations, alcohol consumption, and crime can address some of the limitations that are 
common to the now substantial literature on this important and complex topic. 
 
7. Policy Options and Economic Considerations 
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We conclude our review with a discussion of the economic considerations that are 
relevant when considering whether alcohol regulations should be implemented in an 
attempt to reduce crime.  Doing so requires us to identify the main feature distinguishing 
the public health perspective from the economic perspective: the latter takes into account 
the valuation of the utility loss borne by moderate drinkers whose responsible alcohol 
consumption is not criminogenic.  In a typical policy analysis from a public health 
perspective, these utility losses are not included in the cost/benefit calculations of alcohol 
control policies. Instead, the value of the crime reduction (as measured by the direct 
dollar values of reduced property and nuisance crimes and the present value of the stream 
of increased quality-adjusted life years gained from reducing crime) is compared with the 
direct costs of the stricter regulation (e.g., the personnel and administrative costs 
associated with increased enforcement of alcohol control regulations).  The economic 
approach, however, recognizes that adoption of stricter alcohol control policies for the 
purposes of crime reduction imposes deadweight loss on moderate, responsible 
consumers.  Higher taxes, for example, may reduce alcohol consumption by people 
whose drinking leads them to commit crimes, but may also reduce the consumption by 
law-abiding drinkers.  Since the majority of the population consumes alcohol and does so 
in a responsible way, the foregone value of alcohol consumption by this group should not 
be easily dismissed.
21 
The situation is further complicated by the fact that alcohol may confer nontrivial 
benefits to drinkers and to society.  There is a large body of medical research suggesting 
                                                 
21 Cook (2008), however, argues that this concern about alcohol taxes—that they penalize moderate 
drinkers—is weakened to the extent that revenue raised from alcohol taxes can be used to reduce other tax 
rates or create public programs that benefit those same moderate drinkers.  Moreover, the costs associated 
with implementing more “targeted” interventions (e.g., setting up counseling programs for drinkers, 
enforcing stronger sanctions against alcohol-related crimes) also impose costs on moderate drinkers.  
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that moderate drinking reduces heart disease risk among men, although Cook et al. (2005) 
find no long-term net effect on mortality for moderate drinkers.  There is also evidence 
that moderate and social drinkers have higher earnings than abstainers, raising the 
possibility that responsible consumption of alcohol might make people more productive.  
If these literatures document a causal relationship, regulations that lead to lower alcohol 
consumption would impose costs on society.  
Notably, stricter regulations of alcohol such as higher excise taxes are likely to 
have effects on a range of important social outcomes.  Although our review here has 
focused on studies that convincingly tackle alcohol’s causal role in crime, there are large 
bodies of research on other adverse outcomes of alcohol consumption, including: drunk-
driving mortality, mortality due to accidents and other causes, accidental injury, and risky 
sexual behavior (for reviews, see Cook and Moore 2000; Chaloupka 2004; and others).  
Measured in economic terms, the value of the changes in these other alcohol-related 
outcomes may be substantially greater than the direct and indirect costs of stricter alcohol 
control. 
What, then, are we to conclude about the relative value of alcohol control policies 
available to local, state, and federal lawmakers?  First, changing the availability of 
alcohol with marginal spatial or temporal restrictions (or some combination of these) is 
unlikely to yield major reductions in crime because individuals can—and do—respond to 
such restrictions by shifting the venue or circumstances of their consumption, thus 
undoing the effects of the regulation.  The most credible existing evidence on the repeal 
of Sunday sales, for example, suggests that it has no effect on overall alcohol 
consumption and very modest effects on the outcome that is arguably the most direct 
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consequence of problem alcohol consumption: alcohol-related fatalities (Carpenter and 
Eisenberg 2009; Lovenheim and Steefel 2009).  And while there is credible evidence that 
Sao Paolo’s introduction of mandatory bar closing times significantly reduced violent 
crime, the change was of a very different type and magnitude than is relevant for the vast 
majority of the United States (where very few bars are open 24 hours a day).  We do see 
potential value in mandating staggered bar closing hours (a voluntary variant of which 
was tried with seemingly little success in the UK Licensing Act of 2003), but the political 
viability of this option is unclear.  Moreover, while most alcohol outlet policies with 
respect to licensing disrupt the location or timing of on-premises drinking, in theory a 
larger-scale supply-side restriction on alcohol licenses (such as increasing licensing fees 
or directly restricting the supply of available licenses) would reduce alcohol-related 
adverse outcomes such as crime and violence by driving up alcohol prices, though this is 
an understudied research area. 
Second, we conclude that lowering the minimum drinking age in the United 
States—a policy option being considered by several states (Florida, Wisconsin, Vermont, 
and others) at this writing in 2010—would lead to significant increases in crime and 
violence among young adults and overall.  Both the state/year panel evaluation based on 
historical state policy changes (Joksch and Jones 1993) and evidence from a regression 
discontinuity design examining a more recent time period (Carpenter and Dobkin 2009b) 
confirm that drinking ages have large and economically meaningful effects on alcohol 
consumption and crime among young adults (who are at the peak of the age-crime 
profile).  Were individual U.S. states to return to the 1970s-era regime of allowing youth 
age 18–21 to legally drink alcohol, the results from these studies indicate that nuisance 
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and violent crime would significantly increase among this age group.
22  And while a 
drinking age of 21 may shift some alcohol consumption to later in the life-cycle, this shift 
is still likely to result in less crime overall because: 1) by this age youths are on the 
downward slope of the age-crime profile; and 2) brain development and maturation in 
young adults continues through the mid-20s, such that the degree of crime-inducing 
cognitive deficits from alcohol use later in life is likely to be lower than in the late teens 
and early 20s (Brown et al. 2000; Pyapali et al. 1999; and others). 
In contrast to the active discussion about lowering drinking ages in some states, 
there currently is no political interest in raising the minimum drinking age above 21 in 
the United States, despite the fact that such an increase would likely reduce crime and 
other adverse outcomes in the affected age range.  How, then, could current drinking age 
policy be improved for the purpose of further reducing crime?  One possibility is to 
increase enforcement of the law.  Little research, however, has credibly evaluated the 
effects of better drinking age enforcement, in part because enforcement is likely strongly 
endogenous to youth drinking and crime outcomes (e.g., communities may be expected to 
“get tough” on drinking age violations after spikes in underage drinking problems).  
Some recent work, however, has used more credible multi-community controlled time-
series methods to evaluate the effects of drinking age enforcement training for employees 
at alcohol outlets and police enforcement checks of these outlets.  That research shows no 
evidence that training programs are effective and some evidence that increased 
enforcement checks reduce sales to minors (and, by implication, underage drinking) 
                                                 
22 Different drinking ages across states also raise serious issues about adverse consequences (including 
crime, alcohol-related traffic fatalities, and other events) for youths traveling across state lines to purchase 
and consume alcohol.  For evidence on this, see Lovenheim and Slemrod 2010.  These issues are also 
relevant for analyses of differential excise taxes across states; for recent evidence on this, see Stehr 2007. 
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(Wagenaar et al. 2005).  This research suggests that increasing enforcement of current 
drinking ages through police checks would further reduce youth drinking and associated 
crime. 
Third, our research suggests that increases in excise taxes on alcohol are likely to 
reduce crime.  As others have shown, the real price of ethanol has fallen steadily over the 
past two decades (see, e.g., Cook 2007, 2008).  While our review of the literature 
examining the impact of alcohol taxes on crime illustrates some important limitations to 
those studies, we think there is sufficient evidence on the underlying structural 
relationship between taxes and prices, prices and alcohol consumption, and alcohol 
consumption and crime to conclude that a tax-induced price increase would reduce 
drinking and crime.
23  Such an increase is likely to be most effective when it is sizable 
and does not exacerbate cross-state tax differentials. 
As noted earlier, alcohol tax increases are increasingly common revenue-raising 
devices in states facing serious budget shortfalls.  A natural question is: how much crime 
reduction would a representative tax increase buy?  One recent estimate is that a 10% 
increase in the price of alcohol would reduce youth drinking by a similar amount 
(Carpenter et al. 2007); price elasticity estimates for older adults are generally smaller in 
magnitude.  Carpenter and Dobkin (2009b) estimate that a 10% increase in drinking 
probability increases the likelihood of being arrested for any crime by about 2% for 
young adults, with most of these effects attributable to reductions in violent crime, such 
as aggravated assault.  These estimates imply modest but meaningful effects on overall 
                                                 
23 We do not think the literature is definitive with respect to taxation of, say, beer versus wine or spirits.  In 
part this is because the most common empirical approach is to control for beer taxes, since this is the most 
commonly consumed alcoholic beverage in the United States.  This is an important issue for future work.  
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crime given common estimates that about 40% of violent crimes involve alcohol 
(Greenfield and Hennenberg 2001). 
Finally, although we have reviewed most of the serious policy options that use 
alcohol control to bring about reductions in crime, less commonly debated policy options 
also exist.  Most of the alcohol restrictions we have discussed here work by altering the 
costs of alcohol consumption (e.g., directly, by raising prices, or more commonly, 
through sanctions and availability restrictions).  Other potential interventions might target 
changes in actual or perceived benefits of alcohol consumption, such as responsible 
drinking campaigns, alcohol advertising regulations, and/or product placements in 
mainstream media.  If these approaches were effective at reducing irresponsible drinking 
they might reduce crime with less deadweight loss than other policies. 
 
8. Conclusion 
We began this review with the goal of identifying whether the strong observed 
associations between alcohol and crime reflect true causal effects of alcohol consumption 
(pharmacologically driven or otherwise) or whether they reflect unobserved 
heterogeneity, with the goal of informing alcohol regulation-based efforts to reduce crime.  
Our final assessment is that there is ample evidence to conclude that at least some of the 
extensively documented correlations between alcohol availability, alcohol consumption, 
crime, and violence do, in fact, represent "true" causal effects of alcohol use on crime 
commission.  This seems especially true for interventions that induce very large and stark 
changes in alcohol consumption (e.g., large price or availability changes), as well as for 
alcohol control policies that effectively manipulate not only alcohol consumption but also 
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potential and realized social interactions (e.g., mandatory closing hours and drinking 
ages).  Taken together, our review suggests that, to the extent that inebriation plays a 
causal role in crime, the control of alcohol consumption should be taken seriously and 
deserves a place on the policy agenda. 
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